Bisection auctions by Grigorieva, E.
  
 
Bisection auctions
Citation for published version (APA):
Grigorieva, E. (2007). Bisection auctions. Maastricht: Universitaire Pers Maastricht.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2007
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
Summary of the dissertation
“Bisection auctions”
by Elena Grigorieva
A central issue in economics is allocation of goods. One of the best ways to
allocate goods is to sell them using free market mechanisms and an auction
is such a mechanism. Traditionally, art objects, collectibles and antiques
have been sold by means of auctions. In the last few years, due to modern
information technologies both the range and the total value of goods sold by
auctions have grown enormously. The increasing popularity of auctions has
raised a lot of questions on the appropriate design of auctions.
When it comes to the comparison of different auction designs, various per-
formance measures can be used. Allocative efficiency (i.e. maximization of
social welfare) is one of criteria for comparison. This criterion is especially
important when it concerns the sale of a publicly held asset to the private
sector. Much research has been done on how to set the rules of the auction so
that allocative efficiency is achieved despite the fact that buyers act based on
self-interest. Due to the Revelation Principle, the focus has mainly been on
direct revelation. In the private value environment the challenge is consid-
ered to be solved since in the VCG direct mechanism truth-telling is a weakly
dominant strategy and the equilibrium results in an efficient allocation.
By construction, implementation of an equilibrium strategy in the VCG
mechanism requires buyers to reveal complete and exact preference infor-
mation. It has been recognized however that this is an undesirable feature
of a mechanism for several reasons. First, buyers may prefer not to reveal
information on their valuations for reasons of privacy or long-term compet-
itiveness. Second, determining one’s valuation with a precision up to the
last digit can be computationally demanding. Finally, the full revelation of
buyer’ preferences may require a prohibitive amount of communication.
Recognition that full expression of preferences is undesirable has led to an
interest in auctions where bidders need not reveal their information entirely
but only partially. The challenge (also in this thesis) is to design auctions
that are able to find an efficient allocation, preferably in weakly-dominant
strategies, without asking bidders to reveal complete information on their
preferences.
In this thesis, we analyze to what extend we can limit information revela-
tion while still preserving full efficiency of an allocation. We proposed a
new iterative auction, the bisection auction, and show that for the case of
integer valuations the bisection auction, while being fully efficient, requires
elicitation of much less information than the known efficient auctions. We
show that in the bisection auction only a small fraction of players’ valuation
information needs to be revealed before the efficient allocation can be deter-
mined. In fact for the integer setting we design an iterative implementation
of the single-item VCG mechanism that finds the outcome with minimal in-
formation revelation from buyers. For the case of continuous valuations, we
prove that limited information revelation is incompatible with the efficiency
requirement. We show what level of revelation can be achieved if we are
satisfied with a particular level of efficiency.
Part I of the thesis is devoted to the setting of integer valuations where
we introduce and analyze the bisection auction. In Chapter 2 we present
a full game-theoretic analysis of the bisection auction and show that the
proposed auction is strategically equivalent to the Vickrey auction and the
English auction, implying that also in the bisection auction telling the truth
is a weakly dominant strategy and the equilibrium results in an efficient
allocation.
While being strategically equivalent to the Vickrey and English auctions
the bisection auction outperforms them in terms of information revelation
and associated communication. The superiority of the bisection auction is
shown in Chapter 3 where we compare the expected amount of information
transmitted by players in these three auctions. In Chapter 4 we investigate
how much communication the bisection auction needs compared to any other
auction that finds the Vickrey outcome. We introduce a measure for com-
parison that resembles stochastic dominance. With respect to this measure
we prove that for the case of two players the bisection auction requires the
least communication.
Given the reported advantages of the bisection auction it seems quite attrac-
tive to put it to practice. In order to investigate the practical usefulness of
the bisection auction we conduct a laboratory experiment where we test and
compare bidding behavior and outcomes of the bisection, Vickrey and En-
glish auctions. In particular, we check whether bidders follow the dominant
truth-telling strategy and how their behavior changes over time as they gain
more experience. Data show that in general the bisection auction performs
better than the Vickrey auction and only in terms of some measurements
worse than the English auction. Chapter 5 describes the experiment and
reports the results.
In Part II in the context of continuous valuations we investigate the allocative
efficiency of query auctions. In Chapter 6 we show that in the continuous
setting query auctions, being a good tool for reducing preference revelation,
do not allow achieving full allocative efficiency. We prove that full efficiency
can only be achieved at the expense of an infinite running time of a query
auction for almost all realizations of valuations. So the question arises: what
price (in terms of running time) has to be paid for getting a desired level
of approximate efficiency? In the last two chapters of the thesis we give an
answer to this question. In Chapter 7 we introduce a very wide class of
query auctions, general bisection auctions. We show the existence of ex post
equilibrium, called the bluff equilibrium, and prove that the inefficiency in
the equilibrium is inevitable. In Chapter 8 we are concerned with the trade-
off between running time and allocation efficiency in the bluff equilibrium of
a family of general bisection auctions, called c-bisection auctions. We show
that, by choosing the appropriate parameter c, we can achieve arbitrary
small inefficiency in equilibrium, while the running time of the auction in
equilibrium is finite for all realizations of valuations.
